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court held, regardless of school of medicine followed, the standard of care
was that, "a physician and surgeon use that degree of professional knowl-
edge, skill and care which the average physician and surgeon would ordi-
narily bring to a similar case under like circumstances in that locality." 9
Since this standard of care applies to all practice of medicine in Illinois,
the problem is to determine what the practice of medicine is. Osteopathy
has been referred to as the practice of medicine 0 and osteopaths are con-
sidered to be physicians if practicing with a license." Although the premise
of osteopathy is that human ailments are caused by the pressure of dis-
placed bones on nerves and can be cured by manipulation, osteopaths will
be presumably judged by the universal standard of care that is applied to
physicians and surgeons. 12 Furthermore, any attempt at treatment outside
the limits of an osteopathic license subjects them to liability as an unquali-
fied person.13
A similar standard is applied to chiropractors since chiropractic treat-
ment has been legislatively defined as the practice of medicine.14
Naprapaths, who consider human ailments to be the result of strained
or contracted ligiments, have been judicially defined as practitioners of a
system of massage15 and not practitioners of medicine. 16 Therefore, they
will not be judged by the same standard as those practicing medicine but
will be liable as an unqualified person.17
WILLIAM J. JOOST
CONSENT
The relationship that exists beween a physician and patient can
probably be best described in the civil law term of consensual contract.
That is, a contract springs into existence through a mutual manifestation
of consent without the need for any formal offer, acceptance or consideration.
Despite the fact that no formalities are necessary, one essential ele-
ment must be present-consent. The physician exposes himself to suits
for technical batteries by treating a person without consent or in excess of
9 Supra note 7, at 379.
10 People ex rel State Board of Health v. Gordon, 194 Ill. 560, 62 N.E. 858 (1902).
11 People ex rel Gage v. Simon, 278 111. 256, 115 N.E. 817 (1917).
12 Supra note 7.
13 Williams v. Piontkowski, 337 Ill. App. 101, 84 N.E.2d 843 (1st Dist. 1949). Thus.
the chiropractor or osteopath is faced with the dilemma of being judged by the principles
of physicians and surgeons if he practices within the confines of his license or goes beyond
it.
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 § 9a Medical Practice Act (1959).
15 People v. Mattel, 313 111. App. 259, 39 N.E.2d 689 (2d Dist. 1942).
16 People v. Mainard, 348 Ill. App. 53, 107 N.E.2d 878 (3d Dist. 1952).
17 Supra note 13.
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consent given.1 The reason for such liability was expressed by Judge
Cardozo: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault
[sic-battery] for which he is liable in damages." 2
If it can be shown that a legally competent person has given actual and
informed consent to a specific operation or medical treatment no liability
for battery will arise. Legal controversey has largely been over such ques-
tions as: Must consent be express or may it be implied from circumstances?
Is consent required in an emergency situation? Whose consent must be ob-
tained? What is "informed consent?"
IMPLIED CONSENT
Consent does not have to be express. It can be implied from circum-
stances. "The patient may by his whole course of conduct, without the use
of any express language giving consent, evidently place his body at the en-
tire disposal of the surgeon or physician whom he consults."3
The existence of implied consent is one of factual determination. This
determination encompasses all of the circumstances. Of prime importance
is what the patient said and did. An example is Gould v. Kerlin.4 In that
case, the patient presented herself to the defendant surgeon after a full out-
line of the intended operation had been sent to her family physician and,
in turn, explained to her. She never expressly consented to the operation.
In finding for the defendant, the court held that the plaintiff's actions were
sufficient to manifest consent. These actions consisted of submission to the
physician, with full knowledge of the operation, and failure to protest in
any manner. Thus, the defendant was justified in relying on the plaintiff's
overt actions and not obliged to search for unexpressed feelings.
Implied consent has been raised as a defense in cases where the defen-
dant doctor, after receiving express consent for a specific operation, ex-
tends its scope to another malady discovered during the operation. 5 For ex-
ample, the doctor, while performing an appendectomy, may discover cysts
on the patient's ovaries and proceed to puncture the cysts. 6 The rationale
1 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons § 107, § 108 (1942); 26 I.L.P. Medicine and
Surgery § 32 (1956); Prosser, Torts § 18 (3d ed. 1964).
2 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 127, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
3 Pratt v. Davis, 224 111. 300, 305, 79 N.E. 562, 564 (1906). The broad statement of
"entire disposal" is limited greatly by later statements in the case. See generally, Prosser,
Torts § 18 (3d ed. 1964).
4 192 Ill. App. 427 (1st Dist. 1915).
5 Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); see Note 32 Chi-Kent L. Rev.
152 (1954).
6 See, Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956). Contra, Mohr v.
Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905). See also, Barrett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626
(Mun. App. D.C. 1943). Therein, the court found an "emergency" to justify the extension.
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of the defense is that the extension was for the benefit of the patient and
the result of sound medical judgment. Even though a true emergency did
not exist, the patient had selected the surgeon to improve her physical con-
dition and, therefore, since the extension was beneficial, the patient had
impliedly consented to it.
Illinois courts have seemingly rejected this defense. In Church v.
Adler,7 the patient had consented to a total hysterectomy. The defendant
also removed her appendix. Without any discussion of implied consent,
the court held that, "The surgeon's removal of the patient's appendix
without her consent is a tort."8 In Beringer v. Lachner,9 the plaintiff had
consented to a vaginal curettement or scraping. After she had been anes-
thetized, the surgeon performed a vaginal hysterectomy. He testified that
certain conditions were present which he had previously not known, and
that further prognosis in light of these factors indicated that a vaginal
hysterectomy would afford a better medical result. The court stated, "It is
our view that, on this question of law, plaintiffs are entitled to the inference
.. that the hysterectomy was performed without consent. We cannot hold
as a matter of law that the hysterectomy was discretionary in Dr. Lachner's
duty to the patient."'10 Also, by way of dicta in Pratt v. Davis, after dis-
cussing medical obligations owed to the patient, the court stated, "[T]hey do
not confer on the surgeon or physician unlimited powers to use his own
discretion in the surgical or medical treatment of patients .... I
The liberal view of implied consent accepted in other jurisdictions
should be viewed with reference to the three above Illinois cases. A New
Jersey decision held that the use of general anesthesia in surgery causes the
surgeon to be the agent of the patient during the period of unconscious-
ness. As a result of this agency, the surgeon has the authority to extend an
operation, after exploratory surgery, to correct the original malady.12 Like-
wise, a California appellate court held that a broad written consent giving
the physician the power to perform all treatments deemed advisable was
sufficient to cover surgical removal of part of the Fallopian tubes during an
appendectomy, even though no immediate danger existed.'3 It seems prob-
able that Illinois courts would not accept these decisions as persuasive
authority.
EMERGENCY
A true emergency situation, which endangers the life or health of the
patient, obviates the necessity for obtaining consent. The surgeon is free
7 350 Il. App. 471, 113 N.E.2d 327 (3d Dist. 1953).
8 Supra note 7, at 483, 113 N.E.2d at 332.
9 331 Ill. App. 591, 73 N.E.2d 620 (3d Dist. 1947).
10 Supra note 9, at 595, 73 N.E.2d at 622.
11 Pratt v. Davis, 118 111. App. 161, 165 (1st Dist. 1905), aff'd, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562
(1906).
12 Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 At. 948 (1912).
13 Danielson v. Roche, 109 Cal. App. 2d 832, 241 P.2d 1028 (1952).
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to operate without any fear of civil liability. It has been said that consent
is implied under the circumstances.14 The more accurate approach is to say
that the physician is privileged. 15
The emergency situation is well outlined in an Iowa case, Jackovach v.
Yocom. 16 A minor patient had been severly injured in leaping from a
moving train. Comminuted fractures of the elbow and deep lacerations of
the forearm made the injury extremely susceptible to gangrene. Sound
medical judgment dictated that the arm be amputated to prevent such an
infection. The boy was unconscious and his parents could not be located,
which necessitated that the surgeon proceed without obtaining consent.
The court held that the physician could proceed under such circum-
stances without consent. Therefore, in an emergency, the physician can do
what the occasion demands. The preservation of life and health outweighs
the necessity for consent.
The emergency privilege has sometimes been applied to unauthor-
ized extensions of operations. 17 In these cases, an unforeseen emergency
developed which was critical in nature. Extension of the original operation
was necessary to preserve the patients' health. The theory in extending the
operation being that the patient would have consented if he were conscious
and understood the situation.
Illinois courts have not dealt with the privilege of defense when the
emergency gave rise to the initial physician-patient contact as in the
Jackovach's case.
Likewise, unforeseen emergency has not been considered as a defense in
extending an operation without consent. However, in light of the court's
statement in Beringer v. Lachner,19 Illinois courts would require strict
proof that a critical situation had been discovered, thereby, not allowing
physicians wide latitude to extend operations on the basis of their personal
judgment and discretion.
WHO MUST CONSENT
A question sometimes arises as to whose consent must be obtained. In
most situations, the consent of the patient is necessary.20 However, if the
patient is incapable of giving consent because of infancy,21 or mental in-
14 Prosser, Torts § 18 (3d ed. 1964).
15 Restatement, Torts § 62 (1938).
18 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931).
17 Delahunt v. Finton, 244 Mich. 226, 221 N.W. 168 (1928). See supra note 15.
18 Supra note 16.
19 331 I11. App. 591, 595, 73 N.E.2d 620, 622 (3d Dist. 1947). Cf., Pratt v. Davis,
118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (lst Dist. 1905), aff'd., 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) (Dictum) "We
do not hold .... that there is 'a universal acquiescence of lay and professional minds in
the principle that the employment of the physician or surgeon gives him implied consent
to do whatever in the exercise of his judgment may be necessary.'"
20 Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
21 Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (Ct. App. D.C. 1941).
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competence 22 his failure to object, or even his active assent, will not shield
the practitioner from liability.
When the patient is insane, delerious, or unconscious, consent may be
obtained from a near relative.23 Before the necessity for personal consent
will be waived the patient's mental condition must be such that he lacks
the ability to give a rational consent. 24
In Pratt v. Davis,25 the defendant surgeon had represented to the
patient and her husband that the intended operation would be slight. After
the patient had been anesthetized, the defendant removed her uterus and
ovaries. No express consent had been obtained from the patient. The de-
fendant stated that he did not feel that she was mentally competent to give
consent. His defense was that consent had been obtained from her husband.
The court held that the burden of proving the lack of patient's mental
capacity to consent is on the defendant-surgeon and his decision on the
matter must be supported by the factual situation, in the light of expert
testimony, and not based on his unsupported discretion. The fact that the
defendant "did not think her mental condition was sufficient for advise-
ment"26 is not enough to meet this burden of proof. Consequently, any
consent given by the husband did not negate liability.
The court, by way of dicta, said that if the wife had been shown to be
incompetent the husband's consent would have been sufficient and neces-
sary.27 But, absent a factual showing incompetency, the spouse's consent is
of no avail. In fact, the court was very careful not to establish a broad rule
concerning the husband's authority in such cases to control medical treat-
ment of his wife. The court said, relying on a Maryland case 28 for persua-
sive authority, that no husband has the right to forbid or permit an oper-
ation, when his wife is mentally competent and has expressly consented to
or forbid the operation. 29
Consent to operate on minors must, in general, be obtained from their
parents.30 Minors approaching maturity have been held to have sufficient
capacity to consent to minor operations.3 ' This reasoning has not, as of yet,
been extended to major surgery.
22 Supra note 20.
23 Ibid. See also, Littlejohn v. Arbogast, 95 111. App. 605 (3d Dist. 1900). This case
indicates that the physician may even use force to treat a delirious patient in cooperation
with consent of relatives.
24 Pratt v. Davis, 224 111. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
25 Ibid.
26 Pratt v. Davis, 118 I. App. 161, 169 (1st Dist. 1905), aff'd., 224 I1. 300, 79 N.E.
562 (1906).
27 Ibid.
28 State ex rel Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 Atl. 382 (1889).
29 Supra note 26, at 171.
30 Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (Ct. App. D.C. 1941); see 20 Chi-Kent L. Rev.
357 (1942).
31 Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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There are no Illinois decisions concerning minors' consent to medical
treatment. Despite the lack of judicial treatment, certain statutory pro-
visions have been passed in Illinois concerning consent of minors. Married
minors or pregnant women, who are minors, may consent to medical treat-
ment upon themselves.8 2 Further statutory protection has been given to phy-
sicians who obtain permission from a minor parent to give medical treat-
ment to a son or daughter. 33 In none of the above situations is the consent
obtained voidable.
"INFORMED CONSENT '
An area of consent that has received much recent attention is that of
"informed consent."34 One of the ways a technical battery may arise is
when the patient's consent was obtained by fraud. The fraud relied on has
been either misrepresentation of the very nature and character of the oper-
ation or a misrepresentation of collateral matters, such as undesirable
consequences of the operation. Such fraud can result from active misrepre-
sentation or from a failure to speak because of the trust and confidence
placed in physicians by their patients.
An example of active misrepresentation is found in a Nevada case.8 5
The plaintiff had signed a written consent for a masectomy. Prior to signing
the consent, she had been told by the surgeon, upon inquiry, that he had
no intention of removing her breast. During the operation her breast was
removed. She was not aware of the meaning of masectomy."6 The court held
that the defendant's fraudulent conduct voided the consent and that a
cause of action for battery, therefore, existed.
It has been held that a surgeon was liable for battery in failing to dis-
close undesirable consequences of an operation to a patient.37 The patient,
suffering from a prostate infection, submitted to an operation, which in-
cluded severance of the spermatic cords as part of the procedure. The plain-
tiff contended that his consent was vitiated since he was not told that he
would be permanently sterile. The court held that a cause of action existed,
because the plaintiff should have been made aware of the undesirable
effects and thus been able to make an informed choice between having or
not having the operation performed.
The second group of informed consent cases involves the following
issue: whether a doctor, due to the trust and confidence that patients place
in him, is under a duty to disclose risks of treatment and whether failure to
disclose risks will be negligent.
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 § 18.1, Medical Practice Act (1961).
33 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 § 18.2, Medical Practice Act (1961).
34 See Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1961); 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1445 (1961).
35 Corn. v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955).
36 Taber, Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary, p. M-10, defines masectomy as, "Excision
(removal) of the breast."
37 Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
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This issue was raised in a 1960 Missouri case, Mitchell v. Robinson.38
In that case, the patient had agreed to undergo insulin shock therapy to
attempt a cure of a schizophrenic condition. During treatment, a convul-
sion occurred and the plaintiff suffered compression fractures of several
dorsal vertebrae. Expert testimony established that one of the unpredict-
able consequences of insulin therapy is that an unpreventable convulsion
occurs, often causing severe injuries. The court held that due to the high
incidence of injuries and the newness of the procedure, the doctor owed
a duty to the plantiff to disclose the possible risks.
Mitchel v. Robinson,39 and several cases like it,40 hold that the failure
to disclose the possible risks of surgery is a matter of negligence and not a
battery.
Since negligence is the cause of action, expert testimony is necessary to
establish a standard of care under the circumstances and to determine
whether it was met.4 1 The standard of care in these circumstances is not
one of accepted medical treatment of the malady but, rather, what amount
of information concerning the treatment must be conveyed to the patient.
Various measuring sticks have been proposed: "reasonable disclosure,"
42
a "certain amount of disclosure consistent with the full disclosure of facts
necessary to an informed consent," 43 "substantial disclosure," 44 and "no
disclosure." 45
At first glance these four standards seem to cause an irreconcilable
conflict. But, a central thought underlies all of the decisions. The physician
must use sound judgment consistent with that used by a reasonably prudent
physician in the same locality if faced with a similar medical problem and
patient. With this viewpoint in mind, the various terms referring to dis-
closure become understandable. The duty of informing a patient of risks
can run the gamut from complete disclosure to no disclosure depending on
the mental attitude of the patient, the incidence of risk, the novelty of the
treatment and the necessity for treatment. All of these criteria are to be
examined in the light of expert testimony to determine whether the phy-
sician fulfilled his duty.
There are no cases in Illinois specifically referring to the concept of
"informed consent." However, in Pratt v. Davis46 the court said, even if
38 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. Sup. 1960).
39 Ibid.
40 Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955); Salgo v. Stanford Hosp.,
154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d
996, 152 N.E.2d 249.
41 Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
42 Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 404, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960), afl'd on rehearing,
187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
48 Salgo v. Stanford Hosp., 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 568, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957).
44 Supra note 41, at 401, 350 P.2d at 1103.
45 Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 188, 354 P.2d 670, 673 (1960).
46 Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 307, 79 N.E. 562, 565 (1906).
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the husband's consent would have been proper under the circumstances, it
was still not sufficient. He had not been advised of the true scope of the
operation and consequently his consent was based on the defendant's mis-
representation. It seems likely, therefore, that the court would have accepted
these circumstances to either totally vitiate the consent and hold the de-
fendant liable for a technical battery or consider that the consent was a
result of inadequate disclosure and hold the defendant liable in negligence.
WILLIAM J. JOOST
EXTENT OF THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF A PHYSICIAN
OR SURGEON
Medical procedure usually requires the skills of many individuals.
When a patient is injured by the negligent acts of an individual whose
participation is required, there may be both direct and vicarious liability.
It is clear that a physician or surgeon is liable for his own negligence. At
issue is the extent of his liability for the negligence of others whose skills
are needed.
Vicarious liability is that which is ascribed to a master, employer or
principal for the tortious acts of his servant, employee or agent. This vicar-
ious or imputed liability is grounded in the doctrine "respondeat superior."
The doctrine was first enunciated by Chief Justice Holt in the case of Jones
v. Hart, "The act of a servant is the act of his master, where he acts by
authority of the master."1
The topic that will be discussed here is vicarious liability, or re-
spondeat superior, as another aspect of a physician's or surgeon's liability
in an action for medical malpractice. 2
The vicarious liability of physicians and surgeons follows the general
principles of agency. "A physician or surgeon is responsible for the negli-
gent acts or omissions of his employees or agents while acting within the
scope of their employment or agency."3
In the usual respondeat superior cases, the more frequently litigated
questions are whether there is a master-servant relationship, and whether
the servant was acting in the scope of his employment. In medical malprac-
1 Holt, K.B. 642, 90 Eng. Rep. 1255 (1698).
2 The reasons for imputing the negligent acts and corresponding liability of a servant
to his master are varied. Thomas Baty has discussed the underlying rationale in his book
Vicarious Liability, Clarendon Press, Oxford, England (1916). In discussing the justification
for the rule, Mr. Baty reviews several arguments. Among these are the argument from
profit, the argument from identification, the argument from carefulness, the argument
from control, and the argument from the "deep pocket," which is based on the idea that
servants are an impecunious race.
3 26 I.L.P. Medicine and Surgery § 34 (1957).
